Pourquoi cette détermination de la Communauté Internationale à adopter des standards uniques en Guinée ?

Published on Monday, 11 November 2013 23:16
Written by Abdourahmane Barry

Depuis les événements tragiques du 28 septembre 2009, les Guinéens font face à une implication qu’on peut qualifier de suspecte de la communauté internationale vu les agissements de certains acteurs dans la crise politique. Si pour certains, après les régimes de dictature subis depuis l’indépendance, les concepts moraux de portée universelle que sont le droit et la démocratie constituent un luxe pour nous, d’autres pensent simplement qu’il faut maquiller le système et servir les marchés qu’ils représentent, tant pis pour la morale. Aujourd’hui il y a lieu de se demander quelles valeurs morales défend la Communauté Internationale et sur quelle morale et quels principes, les représentants de nos partenaires se sont basés pour aider notre pays à réussir sa marche vers la démocratie.

Au regard d’une victimisation collective dont s’est toujours servi le système criminel qui a pris notre pays en otage depuis l’indépendance pour justifier le malheur dans lequel il a toujours plongé les populations, certains actes posés par cette communauté internationale en Guinée réputés aider notre pays pour le retour à l’ordre constitutionnel, soulèvent plutôt des interrogations quant à leur sincérité. Ne pouvait-on pas se passer des criminels au lieu de procéder au recyclage et à la promotion de certains parmi eux et non des moindres ? Voilà  le premier « deux poids deux mesures ».

Quelques semaines après le 28 septembre, le Conseil de sécurité des nations unies envoie une équipe de juristes pour enquêter sur les massacres et les viols. Le rapport de cette commission internationale a reconstitué la chaine de commandement des forces de sécurité pour les enquêtes préliminaires. En décembre de la même année, l’un des principaux accusés tente d’assassiner le chef de la junte. Cette même communauté internationale à Ouagadougou, désigne après l’avoir blanchi, Sekouba Konaté, un haut gradé impliqué dans cette chaine  pour diriger la transition avec comme mission : l’organisation des élections présidentielles et la restructuration des forces de sécurité. De retour en Guinée, il élargit sa mission à l’octroi de marches juteux… Continue reading “Pourquoi cette détermination de la Communauté Internationale à adopter des standards uniques en Guinée ?”


GUINEA: How Did Conde Get to 2nd Round of 2010 Election to Oppose Diallo?

Below is part of an archive of Guinea Oye posts during June-July 2010 which focus on the first round of the presidential election. 

How did Conde Get to Second Round of 2010 Pres. Election to Oppose Diallo?

When Alpha Conde returned to Guinea to run for president, he was considered an outsider, having spent 59 years in France, and because of his long absence from the country, he was not considered a front runner.  Yet, the French government was very familiar with Conde and, if he became president, it could be very helpful.  It also didn’t hurt that former French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, was a longtime friend of Conde’s since they met in school forty years prior.

Cellou Diallo was well-known as a former Prime Minister and, rather than travelling abroad for his education, as many did, he went to school in Guinea.  Diallo was able to turn out huge crowds during his campaign for the first round of the 2010 presidential election which took place on June 27, 2010.  See video, #1, directly below of one of Diallo’s campaign rally in Conakry in late May. 

Gen. Sekouba Konate was appointed interim president of Guinea after a bullet to the head of junta leader, Dadis Camara, cleared the way.  Konate had three primary jobs:  produce a presidential election, turn the levers of the government to ensure an Alpha Conde victory, and command security services to repress the people before, during and after the election to prevent “messy” challenges.  Konate did a stellar job in all three areas for which he was well-compensated.

When Ben Sekou Sylla, president of the CENI, showed the initial first round results of the June 27 election to Sekouba Konate, it showed Diallo was first, Sidya Toure was second, Conde was third or fourth, and Kouyate was third or fourth.   Konate, partly because of a personal vendetta with Toure told Sylla to drop him from second place to third and put Conde in second place instead.  It is not clear whether Conde leap-frogged over both Toure and Kouyate, or just Toure.  As one might expect, Toure was livid as were his followers, most of whom were Soussou.   A large group of Soussou women appeared in front of Konate’s house to demonstrate against his interference in the election.  See post #8

After many filings with the CENI over election fraud, the Supreme Court announced the results of the final vote for the first round: Diallo received  44%, Alpha Conde received 18%, and Sidya Toure received 13%.  In reality, Diallo and Toure results were higher and Conde scored less than 18%.  See post #12

Louceny Camara, a CENI member and RPG loyalist “toured” voting stations in Conakry on election day and stole as many as 50,000 ballots from voting stations in strongholds of Diallo’s.  He was caught red-handed at home with most of the stolen ballots. If these ballots had been counted, Diallo would have won the presidency outright in the first round.  His percentage vote won was shrunk below 50% to prevent a first round win threw the election into a second round in which Alpha Conde was inserted as Diallo’s contender.

Further, in a way that only the international community can couch terrible things in a cheerful manner, the Carter Center noted that the number of ballots used in the Supreme Court tabulation of final results was 900,000 BALLOTS LESS than the number used for the preliminary ballot results directly after the election. Nearly 1 million ballots gone with just 5.6 million voters in the 2010 election.  See post #11


#1 VIDEO: May 16 – Presidential Candidate, Celou Dalein Diallo, Received by Massive Crowds in Conakry

May 24, 2010

#2 Doubts Emerge Over Guinean Poll Credibility

June 29, 2010

#3 Vote Count Wraps Up Amid Fraud Accusations Including Ballot Boxes Disappearing Overnight

June 29, 2010

4# Civil Society, Parties Claim Guinea Poll Irregularities

June 30, 2010

#5 CENI Technical Head, Pathe Dieng: Voting Irregularity SMS Reports Cover 50% of Polling Stations “Which is Not Enough for Us to Make Any Valid Projections”

June 30, 2010

#6 Electoral Code Requires CENI to Deliver Preliminary Results by 6PM Today as Charges of Fraud Grow

June 30, 2010

#7 Reuters: Preliminary Results of June 27 Election

July 2, 2010

#8 Guinea Election Goes to Second Round with Diallo and Conde

July 2, 2010

#9 Guinea’s Electoral Commission Reports Vote Percentages for Top Candidates

July 2, 2010

#10 Conde and Toure Appealing Election Results – Complaints Must be Filed with Guinea Supreme Court within 8 Days of Announcement of Vote Count

July 4, 2010
#11 GUINEA: Carter Center Concerned that Supreme Court Tally of Votes is 900,000 Less than Provisional Results — “A De Facto Disenfranchisement” of Nearly One-Third of Electorate
July 26, 2010
July 20, 2010

#12 Guinea Supreme Court Finds that Cellou Dalein Diallo and Alpha Conde Will Proceed to the Run-Off Election

July 20, 2010

Indictment of Former Head of Presidential Guard for Torture During 2010 Election is Good Oportunity to Look Closer at Widespread State-Sponsored Violence Which Brought Conde to Power

Excerpt from a November 29, 2010 statement by Human Rights Watch

“The Human Rights Watch investigation in Guinea showed that members of the security forces used ethnic slurs against members of the Peuhl ethnic group, collaborated with civilian mobs from ethnic groups that largely supported Condé, and in several cases looted and stole property from people who were perceived to have supported Diallo. Although the security forces may have sought to quell the violence that seized the cities of Conakry, Dalaba, and Labé, they failed to provide equal protection to all Guineans, Human Rights Watch said.

Behaving more as predators than protectors, security force members in Guinea have for decades been allowed to get away with abuses including extortion, banditry, theft, kidnapping, racketeering, and excessive use of lethal force, with no apparent fear of being held accountable. Successive authoritarian heads of state have used the security services for partisan ends to repress political opponents, influence the outcome of elections, and intimidate the judiciary.”
The full statement can be found here.
No state-sponsored human rights abuser has ever gotten what he deserved for crimes committed against fellow citizens of Guinea.  Here is yet another example.  Aboubacar Sidiki Camara, nicknamed “De Gaulle,” former head of the presidential guard was indicted for crimes of torture against supporters ofl candidate, Cellou Dalein Diallo, in the final round of the presidential election 2010.  In Guinea, indictments are handed down and the perpetrators never go to trial.
But, Camara’s indictment is a good opportunity to learn more about how election violence was used to intimidate and disenfranchise Diallo supporters, largely of the Peul ethnicity.
Below are three articles:
-an August 1, 2013, statement from international human rights group, FIDH, and its member organization, the Guinean human rights group, OGDH, about Camara’s indictment
-second, an October 25, 2010, statement from Amnesty International condemning the “excessive force”  used by Guinean forces during the election
-lastly, a November 5, 2010, statement by Human Rights Watch imploring the interim government of Sekouba Konate to restrain Guinean forces’ attacks on civilians
The bottom line is that the excessive violence committed by the state took place throughout the campaign, election, and post-election, a period of six months.  The violence included summary executions, raw brutality, and torture.  The victims were largely Peuls
FIDH and its member organization in Guinea, OGDH, announce the indictment of commander Aboubacar Sidiki Camara said “De Gaulle”, former head of the presidential guard, for his alleged responsibility for acts of torture committed in Conakry in October 2010 . FIDH and OGDH, behind this procedure and civil parties along with 17 victims in this case, welcome this important step in this judicial inquiry suggests holding a trial.
Guinea: Indictment of the former head of the presidential guard in the case of torture in 2010
July 31, 2013, the judge in charge of the judicial investigation called the “Case torture October 2010” was formally charged and placed in custody commander Aboubacar Sidiki Camara said “De Gaulle,” former head of the presidential guard during the transition period led by Sékouba KONATÉ for his alleged responsibility for acts of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment in October 2010 in a district of Conakry. ”  Justice finally plays its role and place authors suspects face the consequences of their actions. We now need justice applies to all perpetrators of violations of human rights in Guinea, including recent violence in the region NZérékoré and in clashes between security forces and protesters during political marches that took place since the beginning of the year. Justice has been entered, it must go through  , “said Thierno Sow, president of the OGDH. FIDH and had OGDH alongside 17 torture victims, filed a complaint on May 18 2012 against the Commander Sékou Resco Camara, General Nouhou Thiam, former Chief of Staff and Commander Aboubacar Sidiki “De Gaulle” Camara, former head of the presidential guard. Quickly following the complaint of the FIDH and OGDH before the court of first instance Dixinn (Conakry II), the prosecutor had opened an investigation May 29, 2012 , including “unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, intentional assault, abuse of authority, crimes committed in the exercise of his functions “that had identified the alleged command responsibility Sékou Resco Camara and General Nouhou Thiam, both charged respectively on 14 and 25 February in 2013 . In October 2010, according to information submitted to the court, the elements of the bodyguard of the Acting Chairman of the transition were arbitrarily arrested and detained several people and were subjected to torture in the presence and following the instructions Mr. Sékou Resco Camara, General Nouhou Thiam, and Commandant Aboubacar Sidiki Camara said “De Gaulle”. These crimes committed by those in charge of public authority were held on the sidelines of the presidential campaign for the second round and not directly related to it. However, these violations remain symptomatic arbitrary practices, legacies of political violence and a half-century of impunity in Guinea. ”  This new indictment shows that advance education and that a trial is no longer a far for victims of political violence in Guinea hypothesis  , “said Mr. Martin Pradel, lawyer Legal Action Group FIDH and victims. ”  This is the fourth charge of a senior this year for serious violations of human rights perpetrated in 2009 and 2010, it shows that we can not commit such acts with impunity  , “he added. FIDH and OGDH call the Guinean authorities to take all necessary measures to ensure the proper administration of justice, ensuring the safety of its players and especially magistrates in charge of investigations into serious violations of human Man after this series of charges, including that of commander PIVI Claude “Coplan” , the current head of the presidential guard, June 27, 2013 for his alleged involvement in the massacre of the stadium on 28 September 2009. FIDH and OGDH worry that Mr. Claude PIVI and one of his co-defendants in the case of 28 September 2009, Lieutenant-Colonel Thiegboro CAMARA mandated to restore public order in Forest Guinea after clashes international community in the region Nzerekore that would have a hundred deaths. ”  Judicial advances in 2013 are to be commended for this declared by the President as the year of justice year, but send two security officials indicted justice for serious violations of human rights restore order in the province, it seems inappropriate  , “said Karim LAHIDJI, President of FIDH. ”  We ask that they be relieved of their duties until their responsibility for these criminal acts have been decided by a court, which can then decide with confidence  , “he added.



Amnesty International calls on the Guinean authorities to investigate reports that police used excessive force to quell election protests in the capital Conakry during the past week, leaving one person dead, about 60 injured and more than 100 detained.

Government forces intervened in demonstrations by supporters of rival political parties after the country’s presidential run-off was postponed for the third time on Friday. Security forces fired indiscriminately at unarmed civilians, beat protesters and ransacked homes.

“This ruthless and reckless reaction to the protests is the latest example of violence by Guinea’s security forces, whose brutality habitually goes unpunished,” said Gaëtan Mootoo, Amnesty International’s Guinea researcher.

“The authorities must investigate reports of torture and ill-treatment by its forces and charge or release all those detained, while ensuring that no more lives are claimed by the police’s heavy-handedness as the uncertainty over elections continues.”

Amnesty International understands that at least 15 people were shot by security forces. One person, Ibrahim Khalil Bangourah, is confirmed to have died as a result of his injuries.

Former prime minister Cellou Dalein Diallo, who took 43% of votes in the first round of the election in June, takes on opposition leader Alpha Condé, who won 18% of the vote, in the presidential run-off.

However, the final round of the election – set to be the country’s first democratic poll after 52 years of authoritarian rule – has now been delayed three times due to what the country’s electoral commission termed “technical difficulties”; reportedly a lack of voting facilities.

The latest cancellation sparked two days of clashes between followers of Conde and Diallo, although calm appeared to be restored by Sunday as a government ban on demonstrations was observed by party supporters.

Eyewitnesses told Amnesty International that police had undressed and beaten several protesters in clashes across Conakry.

“I was sitting and eating with my relatives when the security forces arrived in the yard, threw away the plates and beat us – three of us were taken to the police station,” one released detainee told Amnesty International.

Prominent human rights activist Aliou Barry, president of the Observatory for the Defence of Human Rights, was beaten after trying to speak out against the beatings of other protesters on Saturday.

Amnesty International has called for reform of Guinea’s security forces for years, especially since the “Bloody Monday” massacre of 28 September 2009. On that day and in the following days, security forces killed more than 150 people and raped more than 40 women during and following protests against the decision by the head of state, Dadis Camara, to stand in the presidential elections.

More than 1,500 people were wounded and many people went missing or were detained. Many perpetrators of the massacre remain in positions of authority, protected from prosecution.

Since 2004, arms or training have been provided to Guinea’s security forces from China, France, Germany, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and the USA.


Guinea: Ensure Restraint by Security Forces During Elections

Source: Human Rights Watch (HRW)

Date: 05 Nov 2010

(Dakar, November 5, 2010) – The special unit to maintain security during the second round of Guinea’s presidential elections, on November 7, 2010, should act with discipline, minimum force, and neutrality, Human Rights Watch said today. While the first round of elections took place in June in relative calm, the run-off election will take place amid heightened ethnic and political tensions.

In May, the Guinean government created the Special Force for a Safe Electoral Process (Force spéciale de sécurisation du processus électoral, FOSSEPEL), with 16,000 members, half of them police and half gendarmes, to ensure security during and after the electoral process. The few clashes between supporters of different political parties before and immediately after the first round were defused quickly and in apparent compliance with the principles of minimum use of force. However, FOSSEPEL officials’ response to political violence in late October in Conakry, the capital, was characterized by excessive force, lack of discipline, criminality, and ethnic partisanship.

“The chances for violence during, and particularly after, this election are very real,” said Corinne Dufka, senior West Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Guinean security services must do all they can to protect all Guineans and ensure that the electorate is able to cast their votes free of fear.”

General Ibrahim Baldé, the head of the National Gendarmerie, commands the special unit. In July, Baldé signed a much-needed Use of Force Policy, under which Guinean security forces are required to adhere to internationally recognized best practices for responding to violence, including minimum use of force.

During the October clashes, Human Rights Watch received numerous credible reports of misconduct by policemen and gendarmes serving with FOSSEPEL, including beatings and assaults on party supporters. In some cases, the victims were even chased into their homes and workplaces. Based on the reports, some members of the security unit used the unrest as a pretext to loot shops and commit criminal acts, including theft of mobile phones, money, and other goods.

Each of the two candidates for the run-off election is from one of the country’s two largest ethnic groups, and members of each group largely support the candidate from their own group. Cellou Dalein Diallo, of the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (Union des forces démocratiques de Guinée, UFDG), is a Peuhl; and Alpha Condé, Rally of the Guinean People Party (Rassemblement du peuple de Guinée, RPG), is a Malinké. Very few Peuhls are members of the security services, though.

Witnesses described how some FOSSEPEL officers targeted individuals for abuse and theft on the basis of their ethnicity, using racially motivated threats and warning them not to vote for a particular party. Scores of protesters were also arbitrarily detained in gendarme camps and denied access to legal representation.

After the unrest in October, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that at least one person had been killed and 62 injured by the security forces in what it determined was excessive use of force. Members of FOSSEPEL have been implicated in many of the recorded incidents. During some incidents, demonstrators erected roadblocks, burned tires, and threw stones, wounding some members of the security forces.

Instead of initiating investigations into allegations of abuse, FOSSEPEL officials appear to have distanced themselves from responsibility, Human Rights Watch said. Local news sources have reported that senior members of the security forces, including Baldé himself, said the alleged abuses were committed by “uncontrolled elements” within the police, gendarmes, and army.

Political and ethnic tension has been steadily rising in Guinea since September. The body charged with overseeing the election has only recently resolved a leadership crisis, while Guineans have waited through three postponements for the presidential election’s second round. A suspected poisoning of dozens of supporters of the Guinean People Party during a meeting in Conakry spurred ethnically motivated attacks against members of the Peuhl ethnicity in at least four towns. The violence displaced about several thousands of people, mostly from the eastern towns of Siguiri, Kouroussa, and Kissidougou.

The tension has led many diplomats, analysts, and civil society leaders to warn of the likelihood of political violence after the second round. Human Rights Watch urged the Guinean authorities, especially General Baldé, to:

– Direct all members of FOSSEPEL forces to abide by the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials in policing demonstrations, and to frequently, and publicly, reinforce these instructions;

– Reiterate a zero-tolerance policy for criminal behavior and human rights abuses by the police and gendarmes; and

– Inform all ranks of the security forces that credible allegations of human rights abuses by security forces will be investigated and that those responsible will be disciplined and held to account.

The UN principles require law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duties, to use nonviolent means as far as possible before resorting to force. Whenever the lawful use of force is unavoidable, law enforcement officials must use restraint, minimize damage and injury at all times, and respect and preserve human life. Guinean authorities are responsible for ensuring that commanding officers are held accountable if they know, or had reason to know, that law enforcement officials under their command resorted to the unlawful use of force and firearms, and if they failed to take all measures in their power to prevent, suppress, or report such abuse.

Guinean security forces have on numerous occasions in the past used excessive and lethal force and engaged in widespread criminal activities in the course of responding to demonstrations. In 2006 and 2007, about 150 people were killed while protesting deteriorating economic conditions, and 1,700 were wounded. On September 28, 2009, at least 150 demonstrators were killed and 100 women and girls were raped by security forces during a bloody crackdown on demonstrators calling for free and fair elections.

Human Rights Watch also called on the United Nations, the European Union, France, and the United States to exert consistent and meaningful pressure on the security unit’s commanders and Guinea’s political leaders to ensure credible and peaceful elections.

“The second round of Guinea’s elections can be a turning point for people long denied the right to freely elect their president,” Dufka said. “If the security forces remain neutral, act professionally, and respond to any violence by making every effort to protect human life, they can help make this election a victory for all Guineans.”

Guinea Update 4-9: Former Junta Leader, Capt. Dadis Camara, in Morocco to Collect His Mother’s Remains, Next Stop — Guinea


ON RIGHT:  ABUBAKAR “TOUMBA” DIAKITE, CMDR., PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, who shot Camara in the head in December 2009, which Camara survived

After much drama associated with whether or not Alpha Conde would allow Camara to return to Guinea to bury his mother, who died a few days ago, we get word that Camara has left Ougadougou to go to Morocco to collect his mother’s remains and then travel to Guinea for the burial.

Camara became leader of the military junta that took over after President Lansana Conte died in 2008. It was under Camara’s watch that the September 28, 2009, massacre occurred and he is under indictment at the International Criminal Court for associated crimes against humanity. In December 2009, one of Camara’s associates shot him in the head and, although gravely wounded, he survived the attack. Whether it was a planned assassination attempt or something to simply incapacitate him is unclear, but it did achieve the objective of getting him out of Guinea and to Morocco where he was transferred for treatment. In early, 2010, Camara was transferred to Burkina Faso to remain under the watchful eye of President Blaise Compare during his convalescence. Compare’s reputation as the one responsible for the murder of his best friend and then-president, Thomas Sankara, in 1987, must have given Camara pause as he was transferred there against his will. He has been in Ougadougou ever since and was forbidden from attending his son’s funeral in August 2010.

Conde put up a fight against Camara’s return to Guinea for his mother’s funeral. Unconfirmed reports yesterday suggest that when Alpha Conde first considered Camara’s return, he decided to stop his departure from Ouagadougou, by contacting the International Criminal Court (ICC) and asking that the outstanding arrest warrant be launched to keep him in Burkina Faso.

Then Conde did an about-face, not because he realized he was in the wrong, but perhaps he saw an opportunity. Conde had his staff contact and bring in to Conakry several sages from the Forest, Dadis Camara’s home region. The sages asked that Conde allow Camara to return for his mother’s funeral. Conde agreed, in response to the sages’ requests, not Camara’s. Why is Conde so tense about Camara’s return, but is now allowing it? He says it’s because Camara presence in the country could result in social upheaval. The real fear, though, is that Camara will talk about a lot of things that Conde, and others, wish he would not. Conde’s about-face may signal that he has better control over what happens to Camara while he is on Guinean soil.

While Camara is viewed as responsible for the September 28, 2009 massacre, there are high-level politicians and military officials who Camara will implicate given the opportunity. Camara is not about to take the whole rap himself. Sooner or later, Dadis will tell all about connections which Konate and Conde have to the September 28, 2009, massacre. Further, he will likely implicate both in the plot to assassinate him in December 2009. Perhaps, Conde’s calling in the ICC on Camara, didn’t seem like such a good idea after all. Who knows, maybe the head prosecutor has already opened a file on Conde.

Capt. Dadis Camara left Ouagadougou last night and is in Casablanca, Morocco now. He will lay his mother to rest this Sunday.


News Flash: Captain Dadis Camara leaves Ouagadougou to go to collect the remains of his mother in Morocco

(Google translation to English)

Tuesday, April 9, 2013 1:16 p.m.

Three years after his arrival in Ouagadougou the capital of Burkina Faso, Captain Dadis Camara has left his place of confinement for Morocco to collect the remains of his mother died a few days earlier.

Corroborating sources, the successor to Conté chartered a flight with a handful of close relatives and guards to Morocco where it will take another flight to N’zérékoré by going through the Guinean capital Conakry or the Liberian capital Monrovia.

It is a sigh of relief to see that Dadis Camara her mother before she was last home join in his native village Koulet, a village in the prefecture of N’zérékoré.

We will return in more detail on this information in future editions.

Aly Soumah www.guinee58.com , Conakry

Alpha Conde: Stealing Elections and the Guinean People’s Money in a Jaw-Dropping 90-Page Investigative Report (EN-FR)

Further below are links to both English and French versions of a report from the website Guinee 58 which, in meticulous fashion, documents the broad conspiracy mounted by Alpha Conde and his international backers to steal the 2010 presidential election. In addition, he uses his presidency to steal amazing amounts of the people’s money to repay backers and to increase his own wealth enormously.

Most of his backers are from outside Guinea, but were it not for the backing of General Sekouba Konate, Conde would not have succeeded in his quest for the presidency. During the campaign and the election, Konate, served as Guinea’s transitional president, and was the only person capable of moving all the necessary levers to keep Conde’s opponent, Cellou Dalein Diallo, and his UFDG party, in check. For his efforts, Konate received several millions of dollars which Conde acquired from his backers. Konate is as complicit as Conde in stealing the people’s right to a free and fair election.


Mafia networks Alpha Conde exposed by a very rich report

Wednesday, March 27, 2013 9:53

How the President Conde took power in Guinea, bears the mark of a Machiavellian plan preconceived set execution once the presidential elections were in sight.

To win the presidential elections from a meager score of 18.3% of the overall vote in the first round, there was a need to: monitor the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) gain the support of outgoing President and the Chief state – Staff of the armed forces, and build an alliance with a foreign power in Africa that could support financially and technically to gauge the process.

This is exactly what Alpha Condé, with the help of his son Mohammed and his guard, Aboubacar Sampil made ​​before the 2010 presidential elections. In addition, Alpha Condé has created his regime with financial and technological support of politicians and intelligence people in South Africa, with the help of the interior of the Electoral Commission (CENI) and with the support of President outgoing transitional government, Sekouba Konate. Since he took the reins of government in December 2010, President Conde and his son Mohamed and several of their close associates have been involved in many political and economic scandals, some are related to the desire of the President to allow those who helped him get elected to take a turn and others are designed to feed his personal wealth.

We invite you to read the full report:



Les réseaux mafieux d’Alpha Condé mis à nu par un rapport très riche

Mercredi, 27 Mars 2013 09:53

La manière dont le président Condé a pris le pouvoir en Guinée, porte la marque d’un plan machiavélique préconçu mis en exécution une fois les élections présidentielles étaient en vue.

Pour gagner les élections présidentielles à partir d’un maigre score de 18,3% du vote général au premier tour, il y a eu nécessité de : contrôler la Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI); acquérir le soutien du président sortant et le chef d’état-major des forces armées, et de construire une alliance avec un gouvernement étranger puissant en Afrique qui pouvait le soutenir financièrement et techniquement afin de jauger le processus.

C’est exactement ce que Alpha Condé, avec l’aide de son fils Mohamed et de son protège, Aboubacar Sampil, ont fait, avant les élections présidentielles de 2010. En outre, Alpha Condé a créé son régime avec l’aide financière et technologique de politiciens et d’individus du renseignement en Afrique du Sud, avec l’aide de l’intérieur de la Commission Electorale (CENI) et avec le soutien du président sortant du gouvernement de transition, Sekouba Konate. Depuis qu’il a pris les rênes du gouvernement en Décembre 2010, Condé le président, et son fils Mohamed ainsi que plusieurs de leurs proches collaborateurs, ont été Impliques dans maints scandales politiques et économiques, certains sont lies au désir du président de permettre à ceux qui l’ont aidé à se faire élire d’en profiter a leur tour et d’autres visent à nourrir sa richesse personnelle.

Nous vous invitons à lire l’intégralité du rapport :

La version française

If You Don’t Think Guinean Opposition Has Reason to Exit the Electoral Process, See How Well Fraud Was Built into Waymark Contract (EN-FR)

When it comes to Guinean elections there are several truths which need to be stated and should remain constant regardless of whether legislative elections are held this year or two years from now or even later:

1. The presidential election of 2010 was stolen through the collusion of Alpha Conde, the International Organization of the Francophonie OIF), former French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, interim Guinean president, Sekouba Konate, CENI member (and later as president) Louceny Camara, and Conde’s RPG party operatives.

2. When you steal an election, you arrive in office without a true mandate to govern. As a result, you spend an inordinate amount of time planning the theft of future elections in order “to build on” a mandate that never existed in the first place.

3. Conde manufactures ethnic divisions which are closely tied to political divisions. For instance, members of the biggest opposition party, the UFDG, are largely of the Peul ethnicity. Conde’s RPG supporters are largely Malinke. Discrimination against Peuls pays off at the ballot box because there are more Peuls in Guinea than Malinkes. Election fraud in Guinea targets Peuls geographically and in every stage of the voting process: from voter registration, to ballot casting and vote counting.

4. The international community, whether it be the Francophonie, the EU or other Western countries, are desperate to protect precious business interests, primarily mining, in Guinea. While diplomats maintain the mantra, “We don’t care who wins,” this is a ridiculous untruth. Who wins IS critical and there are those in the international community who have and will continue to either help to organize the fraud or to overlook it.

Recently, opposition youth demonstrated in front of the office of Philippe Van Dame, the EU’s representative to Guinea, who passed himself off as an expert on election systems. He stated that the Waymark contract did not pose any serious concerns for holding free and transparent elections in Guinea. Van Dame had no such expertise, but he simply made the remarks out of political gall in order to get the opposition to quit complaining. When you read below about the massive fraud built in to the contract, you will see how shameful Van Dame’s attempted hoax is.

Members of the international community will persist in trying to cram fraudulent elections down the throats of Guineans. There can only be one response, “NO!” This must be followed by pointing out the hypocrisy of the international community pressing Africans to vote in elections in which the same conditions would not be tolerated in their own countries.

5. Finally, as long as Conde is in office, he will hold fraudulent elections and the duty of Guinean citizens will be to boycott or stop the elections altogether.

Following is an analysis of OIF’s audit report of the Waymark contract which was given to the Guinean government in mid-November, 2012, reflecting numerous problems. The report was withheld from Guinean political parties and the press until the beginning of February just days before the CENI made its “final choice” of Waymark. As you read through, you will understand immediately why the report was concealed – simply, it is a damning indictment of the system and all those who have anything to do with it.

Unfortunately, neither time nor resources allowed for a thorough translation into English, so a Google Google translation suffice. Following the English version, you will find the article in the original French.

From guineeinformation.fr

A rough essay on the OIF audit report of 16-18 November 2012: Why do we blame the Waymark system

Published on Saturday, 23 February 2013 7:04 p.m.
Written by Barrie K

Reminder of the context

Like many users, I read the final report of the audit of the implementation of the recommendations of the International Organization of the Francophonie (OIF), prepared by their election experts who spent 16 to 18 November in Conakry, 5 months after their first mission June 11 to 17 (after a mission March 22 to April 6, 2012). When you have enjoyed the content, you’ll see why – although you already know – the Chairman of INEC deliberately chose to hide the audit report. So I decided to make a report as educational as possible.

The purpose of this mission was to ensure that the recommendations that were made by the OIF, have been followed up. Obviously the OIF specialists are strictly limited to technical aspects, and do not get involved in the political functioning of the new CENI, which has been widely repeated in the meantime.

As before, the auditors of the OIF discussed the essential aspects of the technical organization of the process, but they specify, and it is important to emphasize, they have not been able to verify the central system which is essential because it is here that the results are centralized. Only Waymark technicians have the password to access the data, but strangely were absent during the audit- we wonder why? – The day of the mission of the OIF??? On the other hand, they do not have access to a number of documents, such as administrative boundaries and the number of CARLE, the contract between INEC and Waymark to supply the system, decisions and circulars relating to the INEC 2012 revision of the voters list.

And the backup process and centralization of data architecture and system component, module procedure consolidation and de-duplication, certain voter information and the balance of polling stations, the module print maps and lists of voters … – All concepts which will be explained below – and especially the data list which was used in the 2010 elections, show that there are serious problems that justify the postponement of the elections, due to potential fraud, so real .

What do we blame the system Waymark? : Reminder of potential fraud

When it is not possible to exclude candidates (Alhassane Ouattara was a time in Côte d’Ivoire, Koffi Yamgnane or Togo), it seeks to exclude voters. Several techniques are possible, and we must recognize that the system favors Waymark fully.

At first, during the identification phase, we refuse the registration or re-registration on the electoral lists of citizens, we think they’re “bad” vote, citing grounds of nationality generally (the famous Somali), patronymic or facies. The idea of introducing new secure identity cards which the MATD (Ministry of the Interior) contractor would do to allow these abuses. We know what happened in Côte d’Ivoire with this system favoring the concept of Ivorian. The system of identity cards was dropped, but only in part, shall we say.

In a second step, we can delay the distribution of new voter cards to opposition, so they can not vote, claiming a technical reason. For example, a limited number of printers (or failure to use excessive) does not print the voter registration cards in time (see below). The same cards can be printed, but only distributed before the election, so that everyone is not served on time.

There is obviously the possibility to open a limited number of polling stations in urban areas known to be favorable to the opposition, causing huge queues and the inability of many voters to vote before the polls close.

All these abuses have been pointed out in previous reports. To try to understand why it is excluded from Waymark keep by sticking to the status quo (except to accept that the results are not sincere), I suggest you review the technical issues still pending at the INEC, and to verify that the dysfunctions are still numerous, and are at different levels, while recalling that if, despite everything, these techniques are not enough, there is the possibility of cheating on the results (this is even the best technique, and more efficient).

Technical problems experienced by the mission

In advance, it should be noted that the tests OIF held in June, 2012, were on only two enrollment kits in Conakry. In November, 2012, the test was done on a single demo kit (that is to say, that only one one was presented to them), which means that they could not choose a kit at random — everybody understands this nuance very well.

This raises another problem, because if we make changes to the kits (and this is necessary in view of what follows), how will it be done? Would it be necessary to bring back all the kits in Conakry, or will technicians do what they want locally and without control? INEC obviously indicates that there are supervisors who will make the changes on the ground, sic … in a week???, the OID would prefer that the kits be returned to Conakry.

At kits and enrollment procedures

Registration of voters and attachment

Experts from OIF found the person responsible for initializing the kit (the one who installs or runs the program for the first time), is supposed to be anonymous (do not have a user name). It is therefore possible at this time to capture voters without anyone knowing who did this manipulation. Similarly, the user of a kit (which registers voters) can have multiple profiles, image sessions on a computer (the same person can be identified by the names and Amadou Mamadou eg ), and the same record can provide for two voters for the president’s side, for example.

Waymark ,the operator, also has the option of linking voters to districts / neighborhoods that are not within the jurisdiction of the Commission for the AdministrativeRrevision of Electoral Rolls (CARLE). Voters can vote multiple times.

Well the same thing on the kit, it is possible to change the neighborhood and the area, which effectively means a voter who would stand in line for two hours to vote on the day, an then might be told that their name is not listed there (in the neighborhood or area). It would probably discourage people lining up to vote because they cannot be sure they are registered. You can imagine that it is the opposition voters who are likely to suffer these inconveniences, as a way to to discourage voters.

Finally, there is no coding to distinguish constituencies and polling stations. Specifically, when a voter has to register, the polling is not registered automatically, but … manually, which allows all the excesses (see above).

The expert concluded – rightly – that everything must be locked, that is to say, to prevent these manipulations (and obviously on all kits! – See above).

Electoral roll

A database has been installed on the demo kit (and other kits?), But if alphanumeric data has been loaded manually (ie, without taking into account biometric data), the expert does not indicate that they are those of 2010. In other words, we could identify new constituents on this database, but it would not be possible to identify them.

It should be recalled that in the previous audit, there was a difference of 142,198 voters, or about 4% of the electorate, which is the gap between the two candidates in the second round of the 2010 presidential election — around 100,000 votes. This brings to mind statements of the opposition, citing an inscription of 500,000 new voters, primarily in Upper Guinea, accomplished through these maneuvers.

At the back

Data transfers are performed by USB, but traceability is not possible, and if missing data in Kankan for example, appears in central Conakry, we can not understand how they got there. Those identified in Mamou for example, are then stored on a USB key, which are transmitted to the regional coordinator supervisor, and from this to the central site, before being subsequently recorded on the central file Conakry. One can imagine keys can be lost en route between the kit and the Mamou central site, which will vote less. The same officially and legally registered voters, can disappear when not transferring data. On monitoring sheets (paper) existing you can write what you want without it corresponds to reality, that is to say, the actual existence of data on the central server.

At the central file

No possibility of verification by experts

As previously indicated, the OIF listeners were unable to verify the central system, which is nevertheless essential because it is here that the results are centralized, and a computer program – therefore not visible – can become embedded between the retrieval election (voting, for example) and display (and / or printing of results). It is therefore possible to falsify the results easily.

By phone – this is how the experts “verified” the central system (you must take cash for simple declarations) – alphanumeric data are accessed and modified at the central site, which is a scandal, because it is possible to change (creation of false voters unaccounted for example, and removal of real voters supposed to favor the opposition). Although there is a possibility to check everything was done on the server, but the other hand, only the administrator has access to the site, and secondly, it can erase all the traces. The central server administrator has the ability to do whatever he wants … with impunity.

For example, the correction system potential duplicates files between 2010 and 2012 that could not be verified due to the non existence of the file 2010 (or not check) on the central file. The “matching” declared after the transfer (not verified) biometric Sagem 2010 could not be verified. All potential fraud upstream, including duplicates, therefore can not be corrected.

Concretely, at the kit level, you can register eg 200 Mamadou Diallo throughout Guinea, and keep one at the server level in Conakry due to duplicate …!

In contrast, a Sékou Traoré recorded multiple times (assuming it is the same person) can pass through the cracks. Indeed, the data of voters being modified, you can not manually change the mother, for two different constituents, attached to two different offices, so there is really only one Sékou Traoré departure.

Backup system

IOF have established in June, there was not even a backup server in case of disaster or serious incident at the central site (fire or water damage, for example). Or in this case, the file is unusable and must be restored from USB sticks. Which, the original ones or others? Nothing is said in this new report.

CENI announced that although systems Sagem Waymark and were not compatible, Waymark still managed to extract the biometric data of the file Sagem 2010 system, for transfer to the system. As was done in secret, without control, and it was not then possible to perform many checks, you can not possibly trust this file.

Printing at polling stations

Concerning the printing of lists and voter cards, there are flaws, including the fact that if a voter has multiple voter cards, we can not verify or prove that it is fraudulently registered. Traceability of voter cards is not actually guaranteed, authentic cards may leave the buildings at the central site (the image of PV in 2010).

Similarly, the number of printers is not enough, for there are only two per kit (?), Which are also operational in working 20 hours per day over 18 days, to print all documents provided. Obviously if there is a fault with the lack of spare parts or spare printer, documents (including voter registration cards) will not be printed. We can provide more printers in the strongholds of the RPG, but not in the UFDG, which makes us easily imagine, what voters may not have documents on the day J.

In this case many voters will not have their voter cards printed (and therefore can not vote), although they are recorded (see above). The presence of a single operator for the whole country when printing is not sufficient.

Expert recommendations

Experts conclude by saying that INEC should be responsible and not let the operator do what he wants, as he wants and when he wants. For example, it should be possible to test a kit by registering a voter file Sagem (so technically already registered) to see what happens, the enrollment kit to the central server (through all the intermediate stages). This was not possible and casts doubt (to put it politely) on the system.

As it stands, the system has been specially designed to make fraud and RPG can win future elections in Guinea (including presidential 2015), and directly from the polls, if this system were maintained. Without the same conclusions, the OIF notes once again the numerous dysfunctions (that generate potential fraud).

Indeed, if we summarize the Waymark system, there is potential fraud that exists at the time of enrollment, so the actual registration, the preparation of voter cards, data storage on kits , transport data via USB drive, backup to the central database, the development of lists in polling stations, printing of electoral rolls, short at all levels ….


As already mentioned earlier, it is clear from the audit that the opposition should require outright termination of contracts, and Sabari Technology, INEC can not subcontract its work to an inexperienced individual , and Waymark ( whose contract is also found), it does not have the sufficient guarantees of organization of credible and transparent elections, based on internationally accepted norms and standards for the revision of the electoral register.

It must therefore request the initiation of an international tender (or the opening of a limited consultation) for quick selection of a new operator, on the basis of qualification, experience and neutrality.

Of course all this would take us back in time, and might – they say – to lose almost a quarter billion € tenth EDF. These are excuses, Guinea with nearly a billion dollars (already mentioned several times), without Guineans do not see color. They are members of the ruling clan, who risk losing this windfall, but not the population.

In addition, Alpha Conde wants to win the elections at all costs, not having to repay the $ 700 million, the final destination is still unclear, hence its willingness to ratify the presidential decree, by an Assembly National under his boot, the same type as the current CNT.

We understand why the president of the CENI wanted to hide this information because they clearly indicate that fraud is possible at different levels, and that previous recommendations have not been taken into account. Many manipulations are verifiable after the data transfer Sagem Waymark.

If you had to remember one thing previous comments is that OIF was found that some of its recommendations were not acted upon, and especially the most important controls, including the reliability of the electoral list, could not be done after the data transfer of the Sagem system Waymark (transfer pending at the time of the mission, the INEC had said, without knowing how it is elsewhere, the OIF has yet offered to help). Control has not been done – it is also not set, then the OIF specifies that adjustments should be made ​​on all kits returned to Conakry before their redeployment across the country – therefore the opposition is based to fight by all means to prevent the last stage of installing a dictatorship in preparation, namely via a truncated election – a fraudulent electoral system.

Gandhi, a Guinean citizen

“In every free state, every citizen is a sentinel of liberty must shout at the slightest sound, the slightest appearance of danger which threatens” (Robespierre, Speech Freedom of the Press, May 1791).

From guinéeinformation.fr

Essai de vulgarisation du rapport d’audit OIF des 16-18 Novembre 2012 : Que reproche t-on au système Waymark ? : rappel des fraudes potentielles

Published on Saturday, 23 February 2013 19:04
Written by Barrie K

Rappel du contexte

Comme beaucoup d’internautes, j’ai lu le rapport final de la mission de vérification de la mise en œuvre des recommandations de l’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), élaboré par leurs experts électoraux, qui ont séjourné du 16 au 18 Novembre à Conakry, soit 5 mois après leur première mission du 11 au 17 Juin (mission faisant suite à celle du Pnud du 22 Mars au 6 Avril 2012). Lorsque vous en aurez apprécié le contenu, vous verrez pourquoi – bien que vous le sachiez déjà -, pourquoi le président de la CENI a sciemment choisi de le cacher. J’ai donc décidé d’en faire un compte-rendu le plus pédagogique possible.

Le but de cette mission était de vérifier si les recommandations, que l’OIF avait faites alors, ont bien été suivies d’effets. Évidemment ces spécialistes se sont strictement limités aux aspects techniques, et ne se sont pas immiscés dans le fonctionnement politique de la nouvelle CENI, qui a été très largement renouvelée entre-temps.

Comme précédemment, les auditeurs de l’OIF ont abordé l’essentiel des aspects liés à l’organisation technique du processus, mais ils précisent, et cela est important de le souligner, qu’ils n’ont pas pu vérifier le système central, qui est pourtant l’essentiel, parce que c’est ici que sont centralisés les résultats. Seuls les techniciens de Waymark disposent du mot de passe permettant d’accéder aux données, mais bizarrement étaient absents – on se demande bien pourquoi ? – le jour de la mission de l’OIF ??? D’autre part, ils n’ont pas eu accès à un certain nombre de documents, tels le découpage administratif et le nombre de CARLE, le contrat entre la CENI et Waymark pour la fourniture du système, les décisions et circulaires de la CENI relatives à la révision 2012 de la liste électorale.

Ainsi la procédure de sauvegarde et de centralisation des données, l’architecture et la composante du système, le module de procédure de consolidation et de dé-doublonnage, l’affection des électeurs et l’équilibre des bureaux de vote, le module d’impression des cartes et des listes d’électeurs… – toutes notions qui seront explicitées ci-après -, et surtout les données de la liste ayant servi aux élections de 2010, montrent qu’il existe encore de sérieux problèmes, qui justifient le report des élections, pour cause de fraudes potentielles, donc réelles.

Que reproche t-on au système Waymark ? : rappel des fraudes potentielles

Lorsqu’il n’est pas possible d’écarter des candidats (comme Alhassane Ouattara le fut un temps en Côte d’Ivoire, ou Koffi Yamgnane au Togo), on s’emploie à exclure les électeurs. Plusieurs techniques sont possibles, et il faut bien reconnaître que le système Waymark les favorise à plein.

Dans un premier temps, lors de la phase d’identification, on refuse l’inscription ou la réinscription sur les listes électorales de citoyens, dont on pense qu’ils vont « mal » voter, en invoquant généralement un motif de nationalité (les fameux Somaliens), de patronyme ou de faciès. L’idée d’introduire de nouvelles cartes d’identité sécurisées où le MATD serait maître d’œuvre, permettrait ces dérives. On sait ce qu’il est advenu en Côte d’Ivoire avec ce système privilégiant la notion d’ivoirité. Le système de cartes d’identité a été abandonné, mais en partie seulement, devrions-nous dire.

Dans un deuxième temps, on peut retarder la distribution des nouvelles cartes d’électeurs aux opposants, de manière à ce qu’ils ne puissent pas voter, en faisant valoir un motif technique. Par exemple un nombre d’imprimantes limité (ou en panne pour utilisation excessive) ne permet pas d’imprimer les cartes d’électeurs dans les délais (voir ci-après). De même les cartes peuvent être imprimées, mais distribuées seulement la veille des élections, de sorte que tout le monde n’est pas servi à temps.

Il existe évidemment la possibilité de n’ouvrir qu’un nombre limité de bureaux de vote dans les zones urbaines acquises à l’opposition, provoquant ainsi des files d’attente considérables et l’impossibilité pour un grand nombre d’électeurs de voter avant la fermeture du scrutin.

Toutes ces dérives ont été pointées dans les rapports précédents. Pour essayer de comprendre pourquoi il est exclu de conserver Waymark en s’en tenant au statut quo (sauf à accepter que les résultats ne soient pas sincères), je vous propose de commenter les problèmes techniques toujours pendants à la CENI, et ainsi vérifier que les dysfonctionnements constatés sont toujours nombreux, et se situent à plusieurs niveaux, tout en rappelant que si, malgré tout, ces techniques ne suffisent pas, il reste la possibilité de tricher sur les résultats (c’est même la meilleure des techniques, car la plus efficace).

Les problèmes techniques confirmés par cette mission

En préalable, il faut noter que les tests de l’OIF n’avaient eu lieu précédemment en Juin, que sur deux seuls kits d’enrôlement à Conakry. Cette fois ils n’ont eu lieu que sur un seul kit de démonstration (c’est-à-dire seulement sur celui qui leur a été présenté), ce qui signifie qu’ils n’ont pas pu choisir un kit au hasard, tout le monde comprenant bien la nuance.

Cela pose un autre problème, puisque s’il faut faire des modifications sur les kits (et cela est nécessaire au vu de ce qui suit), comment fera t-on pour le faire ? Faudra t-il ramener tous les kits à Conakry, ou faudra t-il envoyer des techniciens, qui iront faire ce qu’ils veulent localement et sans contrôle ? Évidemment la CENI indique que ce sont les superviseurs qui feront les modifications sur le terrain, sic… en une semaine ???, l’OIF préférant le retour des kits à Conakry.

Au niveau des kits et des procédures d’enrôlement

Enregistrement et rattachement des électeurs

Les experts de l’OIF constatent que la personne chargée d’initialiser le kit (celui qui installe ou qui lance le programme pour la première fois), reste anonyme (ne possédant pas de nom d’utilisateur). Il est donc possible à ce moment, de saisir des électeurs, sans que l’on ne sache qui a fait cette manipulation. De même l’utilisateur d’un kit (celui qui enregistre les électeurs), peut disposer de plusieurs profils, à l’image des sessions sur un ordinateur (la même personne peut être identifiée sous les noms de Mamadou et d’Amadou par exemple), et enregistrer deux fois les mêmes électeurs de la mouvance par exemple).

L’opérateur Waymark a également la possibilité de rattacher des électeurs à des districts/quartiers qui ne sont pas du ressort de la Commission administrative de révision des listes électorales (CARLE). Des électeurs peuvent donc voter plusieurs fois.

De même par la même manipulation sur le kit, il est possible de modifier le quartier et le secteur, ce qui signifie concrètement qu’un électeur qui ferait la queue pendant 2 heures pour voter le jour J, peut se voir dire ensuite qu’il n’est pas inscrit ici (dans le quartier ou le secteur). Il se découragera sans doute à refaire la queue une nouvelle fois, sans être sûr d’être inscrit à l’endroit où il patiente de longues heures. On imagine bien que ce sont les électeurs de l’opposition qui risquent fort de subir ces désagréments, en vue de se décourager à voter.

Enfin, il n’existe pas de codification permettant de distinguer les circonscriptions et les bureaux de vote. Concrètement, lorsqu’un électeur vient s’enregistrer, le bureau de vote n’est pas inscrit automatiquement, mais… manuellement, ce qui permet toutes les dérives (voir ci-dessus).

L’expert conclut – à juste titre – qu’il faut tout verrouiller, c’est-à-dire empêcher ces manipulations (et évidemment sur tous les kits !!! – voir précédemment).

Liste électorale

Une base de données a bien été installée sur le kit de démonstration (et les autres kits ?), mais si des données alphanumériques ont bien été chargées manuellement sur celui-ci (donc sans prendre en compte les données biométriques), l’expert n’indique pas que ce sont celles de 2010. Autrement dit, on a pu recenser de nouveaux électeurs sur cette base de données, sans qu’il soit possible de les identifier.

On se rappelle que lors de l’audit précédent, il existait une différence de 142 198

électeurs, soit environ 4% du corps électoral, l’écart entre les deux candidats du deuxième tour avoisinant les 100 000 voix. Il faut donc rapprocher certaines déclarations de l’opposition, faisant état d’une inscription de 500 000 nouveaux électeurs, principalement en Haute Guinée, de ces manœuvres.

Au niveau de la sauvegarde

Les transferts de données s’effectuent par clé USB, mais la traçabilité n’est pas possible, et si des données absentes à Kankan par exemple, apparaissent au niveau central à Conakry, on ne pourra pas comprendre comment elles sont arrivées là. De même ceux qui sont recensés à Mamou par exemple, sont ensuite sauvegardés sur une simple clé USB, qui transitera du superviseur au coordinateur régional, puis de ce dernier vers le site central, avant d’être ensuite enregistrés sur le fichier central à Conakry. On image que des clés peuvent se perdre en route, entre le kit de Mamou et le site central, ce qui fera des voix en moins. De même des électeurs officiellement et légalement recensés, peuvent disparaître en cas de non transfert des données. Sur le suivi de fiches (papier) existant, on peut écrire ce que l’on veut sans que cela corresponde à la réalité, c’est-à-dire l’existence réelle des données sur le serveur central.

Au niveau du fichier central

Pas de possibilité de vérification par les experts

Comme indiqué précédemment, les auditeurs de l’OIF n’ont pas pu vérifier le système central, qui est pourtant l’essentiel, parce que c’est ici que sont centralisés les résultats, et qu’un programme informatique – donc non visible – peut s’incruster entre la récupération des données électorales (les votes par exemple) et l’affichage (et/ou l’impression des résultats). Il est donc possible de falsifier aisément les résultats.

Par téléphone – c’est ainsi que les experts ont « vérifié » le système central (on doit donc prendre pour argent comptant de simples déclarations) -, les données alphanumériques restent accessibles et modifiables sur le site central, ce qui est un scandale, car il est possible de les modifier (création de faux électeurs non recensés par exemple, et suppression de vrais électeurs supposés favorables à l’opposition). Certes il existe une possibilité de vérifier tout ce qui a été fait sur le serveur, mais d’une part, seul l’administrateur du site y a accès, et d’autre part, il a la possibilité d’effacer toutes ces traces. Autrement dit l’administrateur du serveur central a la possibilité d’y faire ce qu’il veut… en toute impunité.

Par exemple, le système de correction des doublons potentiels entre les fichiers de 2010 et celui de 2012 n’a pas pu être vérifié, du fait de la non existence du fichier 2010 (ou la non vérification) sur le fichier central. Le « matching » après le transfert déclaré (mais non vérifié) des données biométriques 2010 de la Sagem n’a pu être vérifiée. Toutes les fraudes potentielles en amont, et notamment les doublons, ne pourront donc pas être corrigées.

Concrètement au niveau des kits, on peut enregistrer par exemple 200 Mamadou Diallo dans toute la Guinée, et n’en garder qu’un seul au niveau du serveur de Conakry, pour cause de … doublon !!!

A l’inverse, un Sékou Traoré enregistré plusieurs fois (en considérant qu’il s’agit de la même personne) pourra passer au travers des mailles du filet. En effet les données des électeurs étant modifiables, on peut modifier manuellement le non de sa mère, pour obtenir deux électeurs différents, rattachés à deux bureaux différents, alors qu’il n’existe en réalité qu’un seul Sékou Traoré au départ.

Système de sauvegarde

L’OIF ayant constaté en Juin, qu’il n’existait même pas un serveur de sauvegarde en cas de sinistre ou d’incident grave sur le site central (incendie ou dégât des eaux par exemple). Or dans cette hypothèse, le fichier sera inutilisable et on devra le restaurer à partir des clés USB. Lesquelles, celles originales ou d’autres ? Rien n’est dit dans ce nouveau rapport.

La CENI a annoncé, que bien que les systèmes Sagem et Waymark n’étaient pas compatibles, Waymark a quand même réussi à extraire les données biométriques du fichier 2010 du système Sagem, pour les transférer vers son système. Comme cela s’est fait en catimini, sans contrôle, et qu’il n’a pas été possible ensuite d’effectuer de nombreuses vérifications, on ne peut décemment pas faire confiance à ce fichier.

L’impression au niveau des bureaux de vote

Concernant l’impression des listes et des cartes d’électeur, on constate des imperfections, et notamment le fait que si un électeur possède plusieurs cartes d’électeur, on ne peut ni vérifier, ni prouver qu’il est frauduleusement enregistré. La traçabilité des cartes d’électeur n’est en effet pas assurée, des cartes authentiques pouvant sortir des bâtiments du site central (à l’image des PV en 2010).

De même le nombre d’imprimantes n’est pas suffisant, car il n’en n’existe que deux par kit (?), qui ne sont d’ailleurs opérationnelles qu’en travaillant 20 heures par jour sur 18 jours, afin d’imprimer tous les documents prévus. Évidemment s’il existe une panne, avec l’absence de pièces de rechange ou d’imprimantes de secours, les documents (dont les cartes d’électeurs) ne seront pas imprimés. On peut donc prévoir davantage d’imprimantes dans les fiefs du RPG, mais pas dans ceux de l’UFDG, ce qui nous fait imaginer aisément, quels sont les électeurs susceptibles de ne pas disposer de documents le jour J.

Dans ce cas de nombreux électeurs n’auront pas leur carte d’électeur imprimée (et ne pourront donc pas voter), bien qu’ils soient enregistrés (voir ci-dessus). La présence d’un seul technicien pour tout le pays lors de l’impression n’est pas suffisante.

Les recommandations des experts

Les experts concluent en disant que la CENI doit être responsable et ne pas laisser l’opérateur faire ce qu’il veut, comme il veut et quand il veut. Par exemple, il devrait être possible de tester un kit en enregistrant un électeur du fichier Sagem (donc techniquement déjà enregistré) pour vérifier ce qui se passe, du kit d’enrôlement au serveur central (en passant par toutes les étapes intermédiaires). Ce qui n’a pas été possible et jette le doute (pour parler poliment) sur le système.

En l’état, le système a été spécialement conçu pour rendre la fraude et la victoire du RPG possible aux futures élections en Guinée (y compris les présidentielles de 2015), et directement à partir des urnes, si ce système était maintenu. Sans tirer les mêmes conclusions, l’OIF constate une nouvelle fois les nombreux dysfonctionnements (susceptibles de générer ces fraudes potentielles).

En effet, si l’on résume le système Waymark, on constate que les fraudes potentielles existent au moment de l’enrôlement, donc de l’inscription proprement dite ; de la confection des cartes d’électeurs, du stockage des données sur les kits, du transport des données via la clé USB, de la sauvegarde sur le fichier central, de l’élaboration des listes dans les bureaux de vote, de l’impression des listes électorales, bref à tous les niveaux….


Comme déjà indiqué antérieurement, il ressort de cet audit que l’opposition doit exiger la résiliation pure et simple des contrats, et avec Sabari Technology, la CENI ne pouvant pas sous-traiter son travail à un individu inexpérimenté et partisan, et avec Waymark (dont le contrat est d’ailleurs introuvable), celle-ci ne présentant pas les garanties suffisantes d’organisation d’élections crédibles et transparentes, à partir de normes et standards internationalement admis en matière de révision de fichier électoral.

Elle doit donc demander le lancement d’un appel d’offres international (ou l’ouverture d’une consultation restreinte) pour le choix rapide d’un nouvel opérateur, sur la base de critères de compétence, d’expérience et de neutralité.

Évidemment tout ceci nous emmènerait loin dans le temps, et serait susceptible – dit-on – de faire perdre près d’un quart de milliard d’€ du dixième FED. Ce sont de fausses excuses, la Guinée disposant de près d’un milliard de $ (déjà évoqué plusieurs fois), sans que les Guinéens n’en voient la couleur. Ce sont les membres du clan au pouvoir, qui risqueraient de perdre cette manne, mais pas la population.

En outre, Alpha Condé tient à remporter coûte que coûte les élections législatives, pour ne pas avoir à rembourser les 700 millions de $, dont la destination finale est toujours floue, d’où sa volonté de faire ratifier son décret présidentiel, par une Assemblée Nationale à sa botte, de même type que le CNT actuel.

On comprend mieux pourquoi le président de la CENI a voulu cacher ces informations, car elles indiquent clairement que des fraudes sont possibles à différents niveaux, et que les recommandations faites précédemment n’ont pas été prises en compte. De nombreuses manipulations ne sont vérifiables qu’après le transfert des données de Sagem sur Waymark.

Si vous ne deviez retenir qu’une seule chose des commentaires précédents, c’est que l’OIF a constaté que certaines de ses recommandations n’avaient pas été suivies d’effets, et surtout que les contrôles les plus importants, et notamment la fiabilité de la liste électorale, ne pouvaient se faire qu’après le transfert des données de Sagem sur le système Waymark (transfert en cours au moment de la mission, dixit la CENI, sans que l’on ne sache comment d’ailleurs, l’OIF ayant pourtant proposé son aide). Le contrôle n’ayant pas été fait – il n’est d’ailleurs pas programmé, alors que l’OIF précise que les correctifs doivent être réalisés sur tous les kits rapatriés à Conakry, avant leur redéploiement dans tout le pays -, dès lors l’opposition est fondée à se battre par tous les moyens pour empêcher d’installer le dernier stade d’une dictature en préparation, à savoir des élections tronquées via un système électoral frauduleux.

Gandhi, citoyen guinéen

« Dans tout État libre, chaque citoyen est une sentinelle de la liberté qui doit crier, au moindre bruit, à la moindre apparence du danger qui la menace » (Robespierre, Discours sur la liberté de la presse, Mai 1791).

Guinea’s State-Sponsored Crimes 2010: Gov. of Conakry, “Resco” Camara Indicted for Torture – Sekouba Konate Should Be Next


sskonateGEN.  SEKOUBA KONATE, former interim president of Guinea and “wonder boy” at the African Union (AU), where he has just been appointed the AU’s special military representative for Mali

Unfortunately, like most news about Guinea, the followig article lacks critical context about the indictment of the Governor of Conakry, Sekou Resco Camara, for torture committed in October 2010. What was happening in Guinea then? The second round of the presidential election between UFDG party candidate, Cellou Dalein Diallo and RPG candidate, Alpha Conde, was coming to a close and a plan to steal the election for Conde was in full swing.

The plan had many facets and involved the collusion of: Conde, RPG activists, interim president Sekouba Konate, Louceny Camara (Conde’s man on the electoral council), the International Organization of the Francophonie and the government of France. The first step in the plan was to ensure that the election went two rounds and the way to get there was to steal 50,000+ ballots from the only guy who could win outright in the first round, Diallo.

Seeing as Conde would have been lucky to come in fourth in the first round, he needed to amass all the resources he could to pull off a “win” at the end of the second round.  In addition to experts at electoral fraud, he would need extensive state repression to quell the increasingly angry Diallo supporters.

And this is where Governor of Conakry, Sekou Resco Camara, comes in. Repression of Diallo supporters,who are largely of the Peul ethnicity, was in high gear during the second round and Sekouba Konate and Camara were the central figures in meting it out. Konate deployed all the might of the military and security services to do battle with unarmed citizens in the streets. Hundreds upon hundreds of Diallo supporters were swept up in illegal arrests and thrown into jails where many of them were tortured. Camara orchestrated the arrests in Conakry and oversaw the torture.

So, finally, after two years and four months, Resco Camara, is indicted.

And, one more thing. After Conde’s “selection” as president, it is widely claimed that Sekouba Konate contacted Cellou Dalein Diallo and told him not to contest the result of the election because there were several groups of foreign mercenaries stationed throughout Conakry who were at the ready to commit a massacre against Peuls.

Seems like Camara shouldn’t have to go it alone.  How about an indictment of Sekouba Konate, preferably an international one, for crimes against humanity?

Agence France-Presse

February 16, 2013 10:46

Guinean governor charged with torture

The governor of Guinea’s capital Conakry has been charged with alleged acts of torture committed in October 2010, a judicial source said Saturday, in a move praised by rights groups.

Sekou Resco Camara was questioned and indicted by a Dixxin court, on the outskirts of Conakry, on Thursday after prosecutors last year opened an investigation into the case, the source said.

The governor is accused of arbitrarily arresting and detaining several people who were then subjected to “acts of torture” in his presence.

The former head of the Guinea army, General Nouhou Thiam, and the army’s deputy chief of staff, Commander Abubakar Sidiki Camara, are also suspects in the case.

At the time of the alleged crimes, Guinea was led by General Sekouba Konate’s transitional government. Following November 2010 elections, Konate was replaced by Alpha Conde — the country’s first democratically elected president.

Rights groups said the charges were an important step for a country marked by a history of political and military violence.

“This is very good news, carrying a strong message: no one is above the law, not even the forces of law and order,” said Thierno Maadjou Sow, the head of the OGDH Guinean human rights group.

“With the indictment of Conakry’s governor for acts of very serious nature, the Guinean justice sends an important signal in the fight against impunity,” said Souhayr Belhassen, head of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH).